


LinuxBoot

Let Linux do it


Daniel Maslowski



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
Agenda

- ▶ Motivation
- ▶ LinuxBoot Concept
- ▶ UEFI Integration
- ▶ Implementations
- ▶ Future Work



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Motivation




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Firmware now vs back then

- ▶ 1999: birth of coreboot as LinuxBIOS
 - ▶ open source x86 firmware \o/
- ▶ 2004: Tiano initial release by Intel
 - ▶ now EDK I/II, maintained by UEFI community
- ▶ 2014: Intel Haswell release
 - ▶ requires proprietary MRC (Memory Reference Code) binary
 - ▶ later on: FSP (Firmware Support Package)
- ▶ 2014: AMD Generic Encapsulated Software Architecture (AGESA) lockdown
 - ▶ binary only since then
 - ▶ was initially open sourced for coreboot in early 2011
 - ▶ an open laptop would have been nice
- ▶ 2019: UDF (UEFI Dumpster Fire™)
 - ▶ criticized by many people
 - ▶ for many years

neglected: Intel ME, AMD PSP, ARM and other SoCs




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State of security

Platform Security Summit


Oct 1-3, 2019 • Redmond, WA



Alex Matrosov


Nvidia

UEFI update process chaos: too many tools, too many problems




Hardware • Integrity • Humans

- update processes are often insecure
- vendors and firmware projects take no responsibility
- great summary by Alex Matrosov




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Right to repair bill




- ▶ vendors still propose security by obscurity
 - ▶ although known to be pointless against sophisticated attackers
- ▶ repair technicians suffer from proprietary information
 - ▶ consumers and researchers alike



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
Platform Initialization (PI)

Platform Initialization Firmware Phases




basic platform initialization: CPU, chipset, RAM (PEI / romstage)

► has to be rerun similarly for S3 resume



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LinuxBoot Concept



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
LinuxBoot



LinuxBoot

- ▶ Linux kernel + initramfs in SPI flash
- ▶ can run on top of
 - ▶ coreboot: as payload
 - ▶ U-Boot
 - ▶ vendor UEFI firmware: remove DXEs, build Linux with EFI support



=> approach rather than implementation



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Integrations

SPI Flash




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Constraints


- ▶ only few megabytes of space (8 to 16 common)
- ▶ build minimum kernel
 - ▶ disk drivers
 - ▶ filesystems
 - ▶ possibly networking
- ▶ build basic initramfs
 - ▶ core utilities like `ls`, `cat`, etc
 - ▶ bootloader(s) - need to boot an OS ;)

=> very similar to OpenWrt, except for bootloader instead of routing tools



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UEFI Integration



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
UEFI binary format

PE32 / PE32+ format, without symbol tables

Three types:

- ▶ applications
 - ▶ OS loaders
 - ▶ utilities
- ▶ boot service drivers
 - ▶ disk drivers
 - ▶ network drivers
- ▶ runtime drivers
 - ▶ may remain loaded while OS is running

=> replace applications and boot service drivers with LinuxBoot



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Tools

- Fiano
 - utk with DXE cleaner
- UEFITool

The image shows the UEFITool application window. The main pane displays a tree structure of the image components. The 'MemoryInit' component is highlighted in blue. The right pane shows detailed information for the selected component. The bottom pane shows the results of parsing the image, including the AMI hash and boot guard information.

Name	Action	Type	Subtype	Text
UEFI image		Image	UEFI	
EfiFirmwareFileSystem...		Volume	FFSv2	
Padding		Padding	Empty (0xFF)	
EfiFirmwareFileSystem...		Volume	FFSv2	
Padding		Padding	Non-empty	
EfiFirmwareFileSystem...		Volume	FFSv2	
EfiFirmwareFileSystem...		Volume	FFSv2	
ImageInit		File	PEI module	MemoryInit
Pad-File		File	Pad	
Microcode		File	Raw	
UsbBotPei		File	PEI module	UsbBotPeiIn
Recovery		File	PEI module	Recovery
CRBPei		File	PEI module	CRBPEI
WRTPei		File	PEI module	WRTPei
CODE_PEI		File	PEI core	CODE_PEI
CpuInitPei		File	PEI module	CpuInitPei
CpuS3Pei		File	PEI module	CpuS3PeiIn
CpuPolicyPei		File	PEI module	CpuPolicyPei
Pad-File		File	Pad	
BiosAc		File	Raw	
CpuPeiBeforeMem		File	PEI module	CpuPeiBeforeMem
CpuPei		File	PEI module	CpuPei
AxiTxPei		File	PEI module	AxiTxPei
AxiCpuS3Pei		File	PEI module	AxiCpuS3Pei
CpuPei		File	PEI module	CpuPei


Fixed: No
Base: 341B28h
Header address: FFF41B28h
Data address: FFF41B40h
Offset: 1B28h
File GUID: 3B42EF57-16D3-44CB-8632-9FD006041451
Type: 06h
Attributes: 40h
Full size: 25716h (153366)
Header size: 18h (24)
Body size: 256FEh (153342)
Tail size: 0h (0)
State: F8h
Header checksum: 3Fh, valid
Data checksum: 23h, valid

Parser: FIT Security Search Builder

Old AMI hash file found at base 3F3748h
Protected range:
Size: 209C00h
Hash: 54DE20BD7CE1709830ABE3DE6FEF88ED943C586E04AF2612C405909E5A395535


BootGuard ACM found at base 339000h
ModuleType: 0002h ModuleSubType: 0003h HeaderLength: 0008000h
HeaderVersion: 00000000h ChipsetId: 0000h Flags: 0000h
ModuleVendor: 8086h Date: 24.07.2013 ModuleSize: 00000000h

Opened: flashregion_1_bios.bin



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Implementations




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u-root




- ▶ initramfs tool written in Go
- ▶ utilities like busybox (ls, cat, ...)
- ▶ offers bootloaders (SystemBoot)



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Try out u-root in QEMU

```
go get github.com/u-root/u-root
# build an initramfs
GOOS=linux \
  ~/go/bin/u-root -build=bb -o /tmp/initramfs.linux_amd64.cpio
# get a kernel
MIRROR="http://mirror.rackspace.com" REL="2019.10.01" \
  wget "$MIRROR/archlinux/iso/$REL/arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz"
# run it :)
qemu-system-x86_64 -kernel vmlinuz \
  -initrd /tmp/initramfs.linux_amd64.cpio
```



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
u-root demo



```
QEMU
Machine View

u-root



~/> ls
bbin
bin
buildbin
dev
env
etc
go
init
lib
lib64
proc
root
sys
tz
tmp
ubin
usr
var
~/>
```



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Heads

- authenticated / measured boot




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u-bmc


- ▶ u-root for BMCs
- ▶ alternative to OpenBMC

Project	OpenBMC	u-bmc
Languages	C++, Python	Go
Tooling	Yocto, OpenEmbedded	u-root
Kernel	OpenBMC Linux fork	OpenBMC Linux fork
Init	systemd	
IPC	D-Bus	
RPC	IPMI, REST	gRPC
Metrics		OpenMetrics



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Future Work



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CHIPSEC blacklist in MFT


- ▶ UEFI Forum openly discussed security measures for firmware development and answered questions from participants

Q: Can consumers audit the firmware? If so, how?

A: There are a variety of tools that can allow a consumer to inspect firmware images. CHIPSEC and UEFI Tool are two tools that can analyze a firmware image and allow a consumer to inspect its contents. CHIPSEC has a blacklist of UEFI modules which include a tool that will check a ROM image for blacklisted modules.

- ▶ Mimoja released the MimojaFirmwareToolkit (MFT)
<https://firmware.doctor>

- ▶ integrate CHIPSEC blacklist in analysis?
- ▶ contributions are welcome ;)




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ACME for firmware update PKI


Since firmware updates are such an issue:

- ▶ we had a very similar issue on the web with secure communication
- ▶ leverage the ACME protocol (Let's Encrypt) also for firmware?
- ▶ create issues on TianoCore GitHub org for discussion




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Questions?



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Thanks! :)



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