



Analyzing and Modfying Firmware with Fiedka the Firmare Editor

Daniel Maslowski



Agenda

-  Fiedka Introduction
-  Firmware Supply Chains
-  Annotations and Data



Fiedka Introduction



Motivation



ESET research
@ESETresearch

...

As in our previous discovery ([#CVE-2021-3971](#), [#CVE-2021-3972](#)), current vulnerabilities weren't caused by flaws in the code. The affected drivers were meant to be used only during the manufacturing process but were mistakenly included in the production.

twitter.com/ESETresearch/s... 4/9



ESET research @ESETresearch · Apr 19


#ESETresearch discovered three high-impact UEFI vulnerabilities affecting Lenovo consumer laptops. Their exploitation would allow attackers to deploy and successfully execute UEFI malware, such as LoJax or ESPecter, on the affected devices. @smolar_m welivesecurity.com/2022/04/19/whe... 1/7

[Show this thread](#)


<https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1590279789205925888>



OWASP Firmware Security Testing Methodology



OWASP Firmware Security Testing Methodology



1. Information gathering and reconnaissance
2. Obtaining firmware
3. Analyzing firmware
4. Extracting the filesystem
5. Analyzing filesystem contents
6. Emulating firmware
7. Dynamic analysis
8. Runtime analysis
9. Binary Exploitation

<https://scriptingxss.gitbook.io/firmware-security-testing-methodology/>



Fiedka the Firmware Editor



<https://fiedka.app/>











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Features

-  analyze firmware images
-  visualize flash usage
-  explore file systems
 -  UEFI
 -  PSP (AMD)
 -  CBFS (coreboot)
-  remove UEFI files
-  embed LinuxBoot











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<https://fiedka.app/>

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Work in progress

-  SBoM, SWID
-  annotations
-  meta data export



DEMO

Let's look at and modify an OVMF image, i.e., UEFI for virtual machines.



Firmware Supply Chains



Timeline



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2011

NIST: SP800-155 BIOS Integrity Measurement Guidelines (Draft)

[...] intended to facilitate the development of products that can detect problems with the BIOS [...]



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2021

TCG: PC Client Platform



FIM - Firmware Integrity Measurement



RIM - Reference Integrity Manifest



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Executive Order 14028 on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity



includes a lengthy definition of SBOM

Buyers can use an SBOM to perform vulnerability or license analysis, both of which can be used to evaluate risk in a product.

Posted on May 12, 2021



A Host of CVEs




<https://binarily.io/advisories>


First post: July 15, 2021



Platform System Interface




Platform System Interface



Goal: Derive a specification, summarizing firmware projects, their boot flows, how they interact as a platform with the actual operating system.



Platform System Interface




Goal: Derive a specification, summarizing firmware projects, their boot flows, how they interact as a platform with the actual operating system.

How: Extract features, compare approaches, reevaluate, improve.



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How: Extract features, compare approaches, reevaluate, improve.

Example: **Auditable Firmware Implementation**

<https://github.com/platform-system-interface/psi-spec/issues/4>



Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)



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Idea

Provide comprehensible information of what software consists of.



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Provide comprehensible information of what software consists of.
Like nutrition facts, but for software.



Software Identification (SWID)



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<https://github.com/veraison/swid>

The swid package provides a golang API for manipulating Software Identification (SWID) Tags as described by ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015, NISTIR-8060, as well as by their “concise” counterpart CoSWID.

NISTIR 8060 Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable Software Identification (SWID) Tags

<http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8060>

ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 (not open/public, because ISO)

<https://www.iso.org/standard/65666.html>



Who's interested?



Daniel aka CyReVolt 🌿
@CyReVolt@mastodon.social

EN 🌐 ⬆

Who's interested in #firmware #SBoM (software bill of materials) to understand what's in their desktop/#laptop mainboard, who supplied the components, what they consist of, what versions they are, etc?

I've been working on this for a while now, considering a talk for the upcoming #rC3.



Oct 19




Steve Springett ✓
@stevespringett@infosec.exchange


@CyReVolt The CycloneDX team is working on the next revision of the spec and we're incorporating evidence into the spec. Had a conversation with firmware security company this week to get some requirements. Would be interested in hearing your thoughts as well.

Nov 11, 2022, 24:51 · 🌐 · 🔄 0 · ★ 1



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
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
Nov 11, 2022, 24:51 ·  ·  0 ·  1

<https://github.com/CycloneDX/specification/issues/129>
Add evidence used to determine inclusion of a component.



OWASP CycloneDX





BOM Metadata

BOM metadata includes the supplier, manufacturer, and the target component for which the BOM describes. It also includes the tools used to create the BOM, and license information for the BOM document itself.



CycloneDX Standardization

<https://cyclonedx.org/about/standardization-process/>

This is a meritocratic, consensus-based community project. Anyone with an interest in the project can join the community, contribute to the project design and participate in the decision making process.



CycloneDX Standardization


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<https://github.com/CycloneDX/specification>



Example SBOM Ecosystem



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=naDYSz1a3KQ>

The talk plans to address several industry-wide items necessary for a broader adoption of SBOM in the firmware ecosystem.



Annotations and Data



Ghidra

```
*****  
*                               *  
*****  
void K2_Right_Click(pointer sender, pointer e)  
    <VOID>    <RETURN>  
    Stack[0x4]:4 sender  
    Stack[0x8]:4 e  
    .NET CLR Managed Code  
K2_Right_Click  
004042d8 7e 4a 01    db[66]  
    00 04 1a  
    33 01 2a ...  
0040431a 36          MethodDe...                               L.S. Bits 0:1 Flags, Bits 2:7 Si...  
  
*****  
*                               *  
*****  
void FormMain_Load(pointer sender, pointer e)  
    <VOID>    <RETURN>  
    Stack[0x4]:4 sender  
    Stack[0x8]:4 e  
    .NET CLR Managed Code  
FormMain_Load  
0040431b 02 7b 55    db[13]                                     This loads the main form of the |..  
    00 00 04  
    02 6f 27 ...  
00404328 36          MethodDe...  
00404328 36          db          36h          Size+Flags    L.S. Bits 0:1 Flag...
```

Right click -> Comment -> EOL Comment -> Type -> Apply ...



Fiedka

undefined bytes, 100 files
7CB8BDC9-F8EB-4F34-AAEA-3EE4AF6516A1 (9E21FD93-9C72-4C15-8C4B-E77F1DB2D792)

FC510EE7-FFDC-11D4-BD41-0080C73C8881

type: EFI_FV_FILETYPE_FREEFORM
size:
checksum:
blocks used: NaN

DxeCore

I don't know what this is, probably removable. Let's see!

ReportStatusCodeRouterRuntimeDxe

I don't know what this is, probably removable. Let's see!

PcdDxe

DepEx
> EFI_DEVICE_PATH_UTILITIES_PROTOCOL_GUID
guid: 80CF7257-87AB-47F9-A3FE-D50B76D89541
type: EFI_FV_FILETYPE_DRIVER
size:
checksum:
blocks used: NaN

RuntimeDxe

DepEx
> EFI_PCD_PROTOCOL_GUID
> EFI_DEVICE_PATH_UTILITIES_PROTOCOL_GUID
guid: B601F8C4-43B7-4784-95B1-F4226CB40CEE
type: EFI_FV_FILETYPE_DRIVER
size:
checksum:
blocks used: NaN

SecurityStubDxe

DepEx
> EFI_PCD_PROTOCOL_GUID
> EFI_DEVICE_PATH_UTILITIES_PROTOCOL_GUID
guid: F80697E9-7FD6-4665-8646-88E33EF71DFC
type: EFI_FV_FILETYPE_DRIVER
size:
checksum:
blocks used: NaN

Legacy8259

DepEx
> EFI_PCD_PROTOCOL_GUID
guid: 245CB4DA-8E15-4A1B-87E3-9878FFA07520
type: EFI_FV_FILETYPE_DRIVER
size:
checksum:
blocks used: NaN

CpuIo2Dxe

DepEx
> EFI_PCD_PROTOCOL_GUID
guid: A19B1FE7-C1BC-49F8-875F-54A5D542443F
type: EFI_FV_FILETYPE_DRIVER
size:
checksum:
blocks used: NaN

CpuDxe

DepEx
> EFI_PCD_PROTOCOL_GUID
> EFI_DEVICE_PATH_UTILITIES_PROTOCOL_GUID
guid: 1A1E4886-9517-440E-9FDE-3BE44CEE2136
type: EFI_FV_FILETYPE_DRIVER
size:
checksum:
blocks used: NaN

Click on notepad button and type!







Data



Data





Why data?

-  enrich analysis, exchange, gain insight
-  feed back into tooling, e.g., Binarly integrated in LVFS
-  back claims, e.g., regarding security and financial risks
-  data drives business decisions



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Previous Work

Mimoja's Firmware Toolkit for unpacking and analyzing firmware images


<https://github.com/mimoja/mft>

-  fetchers for obtaining lots of images
-  analyzers for different vendors



Mimoja's Firmware Toolkit (MFT)

Used in Fiedka prototype (utk-web) - help wanted with reintegration!

 Daniel Maslowski aka CyReVolt 🦋
@OrangeCMS

Time for a break for today. For a preview, check the mft branch on GitHub, or look here directly:
hostile.education/utk-web/A3MSTX...
The output from MFT has more meta data, yes! :-)

localhost:3000/A3MSTX_3_60.mft

Jump to Dir: 0xa8000 0xa7000 0x188000 0x4f0000 0xb8000 0x3a0000 0x168000 0x4d0000 0x268000 0x63f000

type: PSP	magic: SPSP	address: 0xa8000	18 files
AMD_PUBLIC_KEY		PSP_FW_BOOT_LOADER	
address: 0xf0a9000	version: 0.0.0.0	address: 0xf2c0000	version: 0.5.0.45
hash	signature: B7AESD81	hash	signature: FFFFFFFF
size: 576	signing key: 08000800	size: 32768	signing key: C25D8C55
signed: 1435262402	encryption key: 4813CBDD	signed: 30876	encryption key: 00000000
uncompressed	blocks used: 1	uncompressed	blocks used: 9
packed		packed	
SMU_OFFCHIP_FW		PSP_FW_RECOVERY_BOOT_LOADER	
address: 0xf2c8000	version: 0.0.0.0	address: 0xf0aa000	version: 0.5.0.45
hash	signature: FFFFFFFF	hash	signature: FFFFFFFF
size: 81920	signing key: 00000000	size: 24576	signing key: C25D8C55
signed: 78095	encryption key: 00000000	signed: 22908	encryption key: 00000000
uncompressed	blocks used: 21	uncompressed	blocks used: 7
packed		packed	

10:51 PM · Jan 24, 2021 · Twitter Web App



Hack all the things!

